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Dummett's intuitionism is not strict finitism

Abstract

Michael Dummett's anti-realism is founded on the semantics of natural language which, he argues, can only be satisfactorily given in mathematics by intuitionism. It has been objected that an analog of Dummett's argument will collapse intuitionism into strict finitism. My purpose in this paper is to refute this objection, which I argue Dummett does not successfully do. I link the coherence of strict finitism to a view of confirmation — that our actual practical abilities cannot confirm we know what would happen if we could compute impracticably vast problems. But to state his case, the strict finitists have to suppose that we grasp the truth conditions of sentences we can't actually decide. This comprehension must be practically demonstrable, or the analogy with Dummett's argument fails. So, our actual abilities must be capable of confirming that we know what would be the case if actually undecidable sentences were true, contradicting the view of confirmation. I end by considering objections.

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I especially want to thank Alex George and Philip Kitcher for their help on this paper. I'd also like to thank the members of the Propositional Attitudes Task Force, Jane Braaten, Jay Garfield, Lee Bowie, Murray Kitely and Tom Tymoczko. My thanks also to Peter Godfrey-Smith and the anonymous reviewers of Synthese, one of whom was particularly helpful.

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Mitchell, S.W. Dummett's intuitionism is not strict finitism. Synthese 90, 437–458 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00500035

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00500035

Keywords

  • Natural Language
  • Truth Condition
  • Actual Ability
  • Practical Ability
  • Strict Finitism