, Volume 87, Issue 3, pp 331–361 | Cite as

Semantics and supervenience

  • Daniel Bonevac


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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1991

Authors and Affiliations

  • Daniel Bonevac
    • 1
  1. 1.Center for Cognitive ScienceThe University of Texas/AustinAustinUSA

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