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Traditional epistemology and naturalistic replies to its skeptical critics

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Philosophy Fieldgroup, Pitzer College, 91711, Claremont, CA, USA

    James Bogen

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  1. James Bogen
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The ancestor of sections 8 and 9 of this paper was a discussion of comments made by Nicholas Rescher, Mark Pastin, Robert Kraut, William Lycan, and others at a session of the Oberlin Philosophy Colloquium at which I read a draft of the Bogen-Beckner paper on skepticism which is mentioned below. The need to distinguish Humean from nonHumean skeptical arguments (section 10) was brought painfully to my attention by Teddy Seidenfeld in discussion during the Pittsburgh conference at which this paper was first read. I wish he hadn't done it. Section 7 is heavily influenced by Clark Glymour's bootstrap theory of confirmation, although I have no idea whether he would approve of the use to which I have put it. I am also greatly indebted to Morton O. Beckner and Peter Machamer, with whom I have talked about skepticism every time I got a chance over the past ten years.

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Bogen, J. Traditional epistemology and naturalistic replies to its skeptical critics. Synthese 64, 195–224 (1985). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00486038

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