Abstract
It is plausible that Newcomb problems in which causal maximizers and evidential maximizers would do different things would not be possible for ideal maximizers who are attentive to metatickles. An objection to Eells's first argument for this makes welcome a second. Against it I argue that even ideal evidential and causal maximizers would do different things in some non-dominance Newcomb problems; and that they would hope for different things in some third-person and non-action problems, which is relevant if a good theory of rational choices of acts should fit smoothly into a good theory of rational desires for facts.
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This paper elaborates on Section V of Sobel. forthcoming.
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Sobel, J.H. Non-dominance, third person and non-action Newcomb problems, and metatickles. Synthese 86, 143–172 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485805
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485805