Conclusion
We can now see, perhaps, what merits if any this definition has. It ties in the concept of evidence with that of law, and requires us to support our claim that some fact (or statement) is evidence for another by pointing out the science, and within it the law (or what meets the tests of being acceptable as such) whose existence alone justifies us in assuming that a certain conditional statement qualifies as acceptable as nomological. Whoever claims that a certain fact is evidence for another is required to justify his assumption that there exists a certain law. That in some sense there are such justifiable assumptions is clear from the existence of natural sciences and technologies based upon them. But it will turn out that in many cases it is impossible, as of a given moment, to make out a case for the claim that a certain conditional statement, required to support the view that a certain fact is evidence for another, is nomological. In such cases we are able to draw a clear line between what someone may think or claim is evidence, and what we have reasonable grounds for accepting as such. In short the concept offers us a principle of demarcation between justified and unjustified claims for the evidential nature of facts (or statements) offered as such. If this is not a very impressive achievement still it is not wholly contemptible, considering the confusion that prevails among many people concerning the question of evidence.
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Rynin, D. Evidence. Synthese 12, 6–24 (1960). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485530
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485530
Keywords
- Natural Science
- Conditional Statement
- Clear Line
- Reasonable Ground
- Justifiable Assumption