Synthese

, Volume 39, Issue 1, pp 105–139 | Cite as

Objects of occasion beliefs

  • R. J. Nelson
Article

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Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company 1978

Authors and Affiliations

  • R. J. Nelson
    • 1
  1. 1.Case Western Reserve UniversityUSA

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