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Rational belief change, popper functions and counterfactuals

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Abstract

This paper uses Popper's treatment of probability and an epistemic constraint on probability assignments to conditionals to extend the Bayesian representation of rational belief so that revision of previously accepted evidence is allowed for. Results of this extension include an epistemic semantics for Lewis' theory of counterfactual conditionals and a representation for one kind of conceptual change.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Western Ontario, Canada

    William L. Harper

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  1. William L. Harper
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Additional information

Serious difficulties with the construction used in Section III, 3 have been discovered by Robert Stalnaker. See note added in proof to the end of the paper.

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Harper, W.L. Rational belief change, popper functions and counterfactuals. Synthese 30, 221–262 (1975). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485309

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