Abstract
Stit, a sentence form first introduced in Belnap and Perloff (1988), encourages a modal approach to agency. Von Wright, Chisholm, Kenny, and Castañeda have all attempted modal treatments of agency, while Davidson has rejected such treatments. After a brief explanation of the syntax and semantics of stit and a restatement of several of the important claims of the earlier paper, I discuss the virtues of stit against the background of proposals made by these philososphers.
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References
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Perloff, M. Stit and the language of agency. Synthese 86, 379–408 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485267
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485267
Keywords
- Modal Treatment
- Early Paper
- Modal Approach
- Sentence Form
- Important Claim