Abstract
This paper defends a cognitive-motivational account of intending against recent criticism by J. Garcia, connects intending with a number of other concepts important in the theory of action — including decison, volition, and planning — and explores some principles of intention transfer construed as counterparts of epistemic principles governing closure for belief and justification. Several routes to intention formation are described; the role of intentions in planning is examined; and a holistic conception of intention formation and change is stressed. The proposed conception of intending as embodying at once a cognitive and a motivational commitment to action is thus shown to help in understanding both the explanation of action and the rationality of agents.
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Audi, R. Intention, cognitive commitment, and planning. Synthese 86, 361–378 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485266
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485266
Keywords
- Recent Criticism
- Intention Formation
- Epistemic Principle
- Holistic Conception
- Cognitive Commitment