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New reasons for realism

Summary

Both the psychology of perception and the philosophy of perception seem to show a new face when the process is considered at its own level, distinct from that of sensation. Unfamiliar conceptions in physics, anatomy, physiology, psychology, and phenomenology are required to clarify the separation and make it plausible. But there have been so many dead ends in the effort to solve the theoretical problems of perception that radical proposals may now be acceptable. Scientists are often more conservative than philosophers of science. I end, therefore, as I began, with a plea for help.

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Gibson, J.J. New reasons for realism. Synthese 17, 162–172 (1967). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485025

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485025

Keywords

  • Theoretical Problem
  • Radical Proposal
  • Unfamiliar Conception