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References
See G. Ryle, ‘Philosophical Arguments’, Inaugural Lecture, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1945, p. 19.
Of course we must be careful not to construe ‘unprofitable’ here in such a way as to exclude most of the history of logic!
Collected Papers, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1931–1958, 3.404.
Cf. the author's ‘Does Modal Logic Rest upon a Mistake?’, Philosophical Studies 14 (1963) 33–37.
R. B. Marcus, ‘Extensionality’, Mind 69 (1960) 55–62, and ‘Modalities and Intensional Languages’, Synthese 13 (1961) 303–322.
Cf. the author's ‘Toward an Extensional Logic of Belief’, The Journal of Philosophy, 29 (1962) 169–172; ‘On Knowing, Believing, Thinking’, Ibid., 69 (1962) 586–600; and ‘Performance, Purpose, and Permission’, Philosophy of Science 30 (1963) 122–137.
P. Strawson, Introduction to Logical Theory, Methuen, London, 1952, p. 216.
Cf. the author's Truth and Denotation, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1958.
Cf. however, the author's Intension and Decision, A Philosophical Study, Prentice-Hall, New York, 1963; and ‘Toward a Logic of Intension’, Synthese 15 (1963) 81–102.
Cf. the author's ‘On the Frege-Church Theory of Meaning’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 23 (1963) 605–609.
See his ‘On Professor Martin's Beliefs’, The Journal of Philosophy 59 (1962) 600–607.
See, e.g., R. Carnap, Introduction to Semantics, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1942.
Hao Wang, A Survey of Mathematical Logic (Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics), North-Holland Publishing Co., Amsterdam, 1963, p. 63. The view expressed in the quoted passage is not necessarily that of Wang.
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Martin, R.M. On maximum logical candor and extensionality. Synthese 15, 283–291 (1963). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00484858
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00484858