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Synthese

, Volume 85, Issue 2, pp 199–230 | Cite as

Epistemic justification and psychological realism

  • James E. Taylor
Article

Abstract

The main thesis of this paper is that it is not possible to determine the nature of epistemic justification apart from scientific psychological investigation. I call this view “the strong thesis of methodological psychologism.” Two sub-theses provide the primary support for this claim. The first sub-thesis is that no account of epistemic justification is correct which requires for the possession of at least one justified belief a psychological capacity which humans do not have. That is, the correct account of epistemic justification must be psychologically realistic. The second sub-thesis is that it is not possible to determine whether an account of epistemic justification is psychologically realistic apart from scientific psychological investigation. After defending these subtheses, I point out some interesting consequences of the overall thesis which present a challenge to traditional epistemology.

Keywords

Interesting Consequence Justify Belief Epistemic Justification Primary Support Correct Account 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1990

Authors and Affiliations

  • James E. Taylor
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyBowling Green State UniversityBowling GreenUSA

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