, Volume 73, Issue 2, pp 329–359 | Cite as

Physical probabilities

  • Peter Milne


A conception of probability as an irreducible feature of the physical world is outlined. Propensity analyses of probability are examined and rejected as both formally and conceptually inadequate. It is argued that probability is a non-dispositional property of trial-types; probabilities are attributed to outcomes as event-types. Brier's Rule in an objectivist guise is used to forge a connection between physical and subjective probabilities. In the light of this connection there are grounds for supposing physical probability to obey some standard set of axioms. However, there is no a priori reason why this should be the case.


Physical World Subjective Probability Physical Probability Propensity Analysis Irreducible Feature 


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Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company 1987

Authors and Affiliations

  • Peter Milne
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific MethodLondon School of EconomicsLondonEngland

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