Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 13, Issue 2, pp 137–152 | Cite as

Assertion, denial, and the Liar Paradox

  • Terence Parsons


Liar Paradox 
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Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company 1984

Authors and Affiliations

  • Terence Parsons
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of California at IrvineIrvineU.S.A.

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