Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 4, Issue 2, pp 117–131 | Cite as

A group majority voting model of public good provision

  • R. B. Morton


A model of public good provision by majority rule selection incorporating the behavior of rational group voting is formulated. Two probability maximizing candidates are assumed. If voters are risk averse in public sector preferences, then a unique symmetric (both candidates offering identical platforms) equilibrium exists. If certain additional conditions hold on the group cost functions of political support, this equilibrium will lie at the public good levels which maximizes the sum of voter utility. It is further demonstrated that it is unlikely for those conditions to be satisfied and therefore more realistic asymmetric equilibria with positive voter turnout is predicted.


Cost Function Public Sector Rule Selection Majority Vote Rational Group 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 1987

Authors and Affiliations

  • R. B. Morton
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Economics and FinanceNicholls State UniversityThibodauxUSA

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