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The best voting method: A review of “voting procedures” by Michael Dummett

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Centre de Recherches en Économie Mathématique et Économétrie, U.R.A.-C.N.R.S. D 1273, Université de Caen, F-14032, Caen Cédex, France

    M. Salles

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  1. M. Salles
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Voting procedures, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1984.

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Salles, M. The best voting method: A review of “voting procedures” by Michael Dummett. Soc Choice Welfare 6, 337–346 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00446991

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00446991

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