Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 6, Issue 4, pp 275–286 | Cite as

Pressure group size and the politics of income redistribution

  • D. Wittman
Article

Abstract

Numerous authors have argued that small groups with concentrated interests have an advantage over larger groups with more diffuse interests. We argue that the reverse situation is more likely. In addition, we extend the one candidate analysis to situations where there are two contestants for any one legislative seat.

Keywords

Small Group Group Size Economic Theory Reverse Situation Pressure Group 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 1989

Authors and Affiliations

  • D. Wittman
    • 1
  1. 1.University of CaliforniaSanta CruzUSA

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