Abstract
We formulate a voting model for a legislature composed of two disjoint and cohesive subgroups. Each subgroup has a leader, and its cohesiveness is measured by the probability that a member votes the same way as the leader, which is presumed to be the same for all non-leader members within a subgroup. We examine the relative powers of the subgroups as a function of their sizes and cohesiveness.
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Gehrlein, W.V., Fishburn, P.C. Division of power in legislatures with two cohesive subgroups. Soc Choice Welfare 3, 119–124 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00435662
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00435662