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Special majority rules necessary and sufficient condition for quasi-transitivity with quasi-transitive individual preferences

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Abstract

A condition on preferences called strict Latin Square partial agreement is introduced and is shown to be necessary and sufficient for quasi-transitivity of the social weak preference relation generated by any special majority rule, under the assumption that individual preferences themselves are quasi-transitive.

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Jain, S.K. Special majority rules necessary and sufficient condition for quasi-transitivity with quasi-transitive individual preferences. Soc Choice Welfare 3, 99–106 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00435660

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00435660

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