Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

3. Voting sets

  • Conjectures and Unsolved Problems
  • Published:
Social Choice and Welfare Aims and scope Submit manuscript

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

References

  1. Arrow KJ (1963) Social choice and individual values. Yale University Press, New Haven

    Google Scholar 

  2. McKelvey R (1979) General conditions for global intransitivities in formal voting models. Econometrica 47: 1085–1112

    Google Scholar 

  3. Schofield N (1985) Social choice and democracy. Springer, Berlin Heidelberg New York

    Google Scholar 

  4. Shafer N, Sonnenschein H (1982) Market demand and excess demand functions. In: Arrow KJ and Intriligator MD (1982) Handbook of mathematical economics, Vol. 11. North-Holland, Amsterdam

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Syracuse University, 13210, Syracuse, NY, USA

    J. S. Kelly

Authors
  1. J. S. Kelly
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Kelly, J.S. 3. Voting sets. Soc Choice Welfare 4, 235–239 (1987). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00433949

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00433949

Keywords

Search

Navigation