Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 4, Issue 3, pp 185–206 | Cite as

Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules

  • T. N. Tideman


“Independence of clones” is a generalization of the condition of not being subject to the perverse consequences of vote splitting that arise under plurality voting. A new voting rule that is at least “almost always” independent of clones is obtained by the following algorithm: Require the collective ranking of the candidates to be consistent with the paired comparisons decided by the largest and second largest margins, and then, if possible, with the paired comparison decided by the third largest margin, and so on. The advantages of this “ranked pairs” rule over previously proposed voting rules that are independent of clones is that it possesses Condorcet consistency, non-negative responsiveness, and “resolvability” (the property that every tie be within one vote of being broken).


Economic Theory Paired Comparison Vote Rule Large Margin Plurality Vote 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 1987

Authors and Affiliations

  • T. N. Tideman
    • 1
  1. 1.Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State UniversityBlacksburgUSA

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