Abstract
Two contradictory views on the relationship between independence of irrelevant alternatives and welfarism have appeared in the social choice literature. I show that the contradictory views result from the use of two different forms of independence of irrelevant alternatives. It is shown that one form implies welfarism while the other does not.
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I would like to thank Peter Murrell, Yew-Kwang Ng, Amartya Sen and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
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Kennelly, B. Welfarism, IIA and arrovian constitutional rules. Soc Choice Welfare 5, 307–311 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00433659
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00433659