Abstract
This paper shows that results similar to the Paretian Epidemic of Sen (1976) can be proved with the Pareto principle replaced by weaker conditions. The Pareto principle can be factored into a monotonicity component and a non-imposition component. Our results show that it is the non-imposition component which is responsible for the epidemic.
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Kelsey, D. What is responsible for the “Paretian epidemic”?. Soc Choice Welfare 5, 303–306 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00433658
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00433658