Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Rights and the liberal paradoxes

  • Published:
Social Choice and Welfare Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Traditional social choice theory does not distinguish between the choices and the preferences of an individual. However, it is often rational for an individual to make choices that do not follow his preferences, e.g. when he makes compromises with other individuals. A social choice format is introduced with separate representations for choice and preference. It is shown how different types of rights and other legal positions can be expressed in this format. Definitions are given of what it means for rights to be compatible and for a set of rights to be respected. Further, it is shown that much weaker (and fully plausible) conditions are needed to avoid Sen's paradox (the impossibility of a Paretian liberal) in this social choice format than in a traditional format that does not distinguish between choices and preferences. As an example of this, Sen's paradox can be avoided if each individual, ceteris paribus, prefers that her choices be respected in matters that belong to her own personal sphere.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Blau JH (1975) Liberal values and independence. Rev Econ Studies 42:395–402

    Google Scholar 

  • Breyer F, Gigliotti GA (1980) Empathy and the respect for the right of others. Z Nationalökon 40: 59–64

    Google Scholar 

  • Gaertner W, Krüger L (1981) Self-supporting preferences and individual rights: the possibility of Paretian liberalism. Economica 48:17–28

    Google Scholar 

  • Gibbard A (1974) A Pareto-consistent libertarian claim. J Econ Theory 7:388–410

    Google Scholar 

  • Gibbard A (1982) Rights and the theory of social choice. In: Cohen LJ et al. (eds) Logic, methodology and philosophy of science, Vol. VI. North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp 595–605

    Google Scholar 

  • Gärdenfors P (1981) Rights, games and social choice. Nous 15:341–356

    Google Scholar 

  • Hammond PJ (1982) Liberalism, independent rights and the Pareto principle. In: Cohen LJ et al. (eds) Logic, methodology and philosophy of science. Vol. VI. North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp 607–620

    Google Scholar 

  • Hansson SO (1986a) Individuals and collective actions. Theoria 52:87–97

    Google Scholar 

  • Hansson SO (1986b) A note on the typology of rights. In: Needham P, Odelstad J (eds) Changing positions, Philosophical Studies, No. 38. Department of Philosophy Uppsala

    Google Scholar 

  • Hansson SO (1986c) A formal representation of rights and legal relations (Manuscript)

  • Kanger S, Kanger H (1966) Rights and parliamentarism. Theoria 32:85–115

    Google Scholar 

  • Kelsey D (1984) The consistency of liberal rights. (Manuscript)

  • Kelsey D (1985) The liberal paradox: a generalisation. Soc Choice Welfare 1:245–250

    Google Scholar 

  • Lindahl L (1977) Position and change. A study in law and logic. Reidel, Dordrecht

    Google Scholar 

  • Nozick R (1974) Anarchy, state and utopia. Basic Books, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Seidl C (1975) On liberal values. Z Nationalökon 35:257–292

    Google Scholar 

  • Sen A (1970) The impossibility of a Paretian liberal. J Polit Econ 78:152–157

    Google Scholar 

  • Sen A (1971) Choice functions and revealed preference. Rev Econ Studies 38:307–317 [Reprinted in: Sen A (1982) Choice, welfare and measurement. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, pp 41–53]

    Google Scholar 

  • Sen A (1976) Liberty, unanimity and rights. Economica 43:217–245 [Reprinted in: Sen A (1982) Choice, welfare and measurement. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, pp 291–326]

    Google Scholar 

  • Sen A (1982a) Rights and agency. Philos Publ Aff 11:3–39

    Google Scholar 

  • Sen A (1982b) Liberty as control: an appraisal. Midwest Studies Philos 7:207–221

    Google Scholar 

  • Sen A (1983) Liberty and social choice. J Philos 80:5–28

    Google Scholar 

  • Sugden R (1985) Liberty, preference and choice. Econ Philos 1:189–205

    Google Scholar 

  • Suzumura K (1978) On the consistency of libertarian claims. Rev Econ Studies 45:329–342

    Google Scholar 

  • Wriglesworth JL (1985) Libertarian conflicts in social choice. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Philosophy, Villavägen 5, S-75236, Uppsala, Sweden

    S. O. Hansson

Authors
  1. S. O. Hansson
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Additional information

An earlier version of this paper has been discussed at a Swedish-English Symposium on Rights and Rationality. I would like to thank the participants, Peter Gärdenfors, William Hart, Stig Kanger, David Kelsey, Prasanta Pattanaik, and Robert Sugden for valuable comments.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Hansson, S.O. Rights and the liberal paradoxes. Soc Choice Welfare 5, 287–302 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00433657

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00433657

Keywords

Search

Navigation