Abstract
We develop an incomplete information model of a sequence of elections in a one-dimensional policy space, where voters have no contemporaneous information about candidate positions, and candidates have no information about voter preferences. The only source of information is contemporaneous endorsement data and historical data on the policy positions of previous winning candidates. We define a notion of “stationary rational expectations equilibrium”, and show that such an equilibrium results in outcomes which are equivalent to those that would occur under full information.
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McKelvey RD, Ordeshook PC (1985a) Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources. J Econ Theory 36:55–85
McKelvey RD, Ordeshook PC (1985b) Sequential elections with limited information. Am J Polit Sci 29:480–512
McKelvey RD, Ordeshook PC (1986) Elections with limited information: A multidimensional model. Math Soc Sci (in press)
McKelvey RD, Page T (1986) Common knowledge, consensus, and aggregate information. Econometrica 54:109–127
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We acknowledge support from ISF Grant #SES 82-08184 and #SES84-09654
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McKelvey, R.D., Ordeshook, P.C. Sequential elections with limited information. Soc Choice Welfare 3, 199–211 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00433535
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00433535