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Sequential elections with limited information

A formal analysis

Abstract

We develop an incomplete information model of a sequence of elections in a one-dimensional policy space, where voters have no contemporaneous information about candidate positions, and candidates have no information about voter preferences. The only source of information is contemporaneous endorsement data and historical data on the policy positions of previous winning candidates. We define a notion of “stationary rational expectations equilibrium”, and show that such an equilibrium results in outcomes which are equivalent to those that would occur under full information.

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References

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Additional information

We acknowledge support from ISF Grant #SES 82-08184 and #SES84-09654

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McKelvey, R.D., Ordeshook, P.C. Sequential elections with limited information. Soc Choice Welfare 3, 199–211 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00433535

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00433535

Keywords

  • Economic Theory
  • Historical Data
  • Incomplete Information
  • Full Information
  • Information Model