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Indication and adaptation

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between a family of concepts involving reliable correlation, and a family of concepts involving adaptation and biological function, as these concepts are used in the naturalistic semantic theory of Dretske's Explaining Behavior. I argue that Dretske's attempt to marry correlation and function to produce representation fails, though aspects of his failure point the way forward to a better theory.

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Godfrey-Smith, P. Indication and adaptation. Synthese 92, 283–312 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00414302

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00414302

Keywords

  • Biological Function
  • Good Theory
  • Semantic Theory
  • Failure Point
  • Reliable Correlation