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This paper owes a great deal to Chs. 2 and 3 of Curley's, Spinoza's Metaphysics, as well as Donagan's Leibnizian treatment of “intrinsically possible essence”, in his article, ‘Spinoza's Proof of Immortality’. I am also indebted to Charles Jarrett for his incisive APA comments and criticism of an earlier draft of this paper, delivered at the APA meetings in New York, December 1984. The final version of this paper has incorporated many of my responses to those criticisms. I should further note that Stuart Hampshire, in his paper, ‘Spinoza and the Idea of Freedom’ (on page 300 of the Grene anthology), emphasizes the distinction between “the two orders of explanation, ..., the temporal and the non-temporal order ...” and points out the correspondence to Leibniz' distinction between truths of reason and truths of fact. Finally, I wish to thank Professor Jaakko Hintikka for his helpfulness in the publication of this paper.
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Friedman, J. How the finite follows from the infinite in Spinoza's metaphysical system. Synthese 69, 371–407 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00413979
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00413979