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Risk and diversification in theory choice

Abstract

How can it be rational to work on a new theory that does not yet meet the standards for good or acceptable theories? If diversity of approaches is a condition for scientific progress, how can a scientific community achieve such progress when each member does what it is rational to do, namely work on the best theory? These two methodological problems, the problem of pursuit and the problem of diversity, can be solved by taking into account the cognitive risk that is involved in theory choice. I compare this solution to other proposals, in particular T. S. Kuhn's and P. Kitcher's view that the two problems demonstrate the epistemic significance of the scientific community.

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For criticism and advice I thank Tilman Lichter, Bill Talbott, Catherine Wilson, and, in particular, an anonymous referee for Synthese.

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Rueger, A. Risk and diversification in theory choice. Synthese 109, 263–280 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00413769

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00413769

Keywords

  • Scientific Community
  • Good Theory
  • Methodological Problem
  • Theory Choice
  • Scientific Progress