Abstract
How can it be rational to work on a new theory that does not yet meet the standards for good or acceptable theories? If diversity of approaches is a condition for scientific progress, how can a scientific community achieve such progress when each member does what it is rational to do, namely work on the best theory? These two methodological problems, the problem of pursuit and the problem of diversity, can be solved by taking into account the cognitive risk that is involved in theory choice. I compare this solution to other proposals, in particular T. S. Kuhn's and P. Kitcher's view that the two problems demonstrate the epistemic significance of the scientific community.
This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.
References
Breit, G.: 1933, ‘Quantum Theory of Dispersion. Parts VI and VII’, Reviews of Modern Physics 5, 91–140.
Brown, L. M. and L. Hoddeson (eds.): 1983, The Birth of Particle Physics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Cassidy, D. C.: 1981, ‘Cosmic Ray Showers, High Energy Physics, and Quantum Field Theory: Programmatic Interactions in the 1930s’, Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences 12, 1–39.
Darrigol, O.: 1986, ‘The Origin of Quantized Matter Waves’, Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences 16, 197–253.
Elton, E. J. and M. J. Gruber: 1991, Modern Portfolio Theory and Investment Analysis, 4th ed., Wiley, New York.
Feyerabend, P. K.: 1975, Against Method, Verso, London.
Gorman, M. E. and M. E. Gorman: 1984, ‘A Comparison of Confirmatory, Disconfirmatory and a Control Strategy on Wason's 2-4-6 Task’, Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 36A, 629–48.
Heisenberg, W.: 1943, ‘[Book Review] Wentzel, G., Einfuehrung in die Quantentheorie der Wellenfelder’, Naturwissenschaften 51, 251–52.
Heisenberg, W.: 1953, ‘Doubts and Hopes in Quantum Electrodynamics’, Physica 19, 897–908.
Keeney, R. L. and H. Raiffa: 1993, Decisions with Multiple Objectives, Cambridge University Press, New York.
Kitcher, P.: 1990, ‘The Division of Cognitive Labor’, Journal of Philosophy 87, 5–22.
Kitcher, P.: 1993, The Advancement of Science, Oxford University Press, New York.
Kuhn, T. S.: 1962, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Kuhn, T. S.: 1970, ‘Reflections on my Critics’, in: I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 231–78.
Kuhn, T. S.: 1977, ‘Objectivity, Values and Theory Choice’, in: Kuhn, The Essential Tension, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 320–39.
Laudan, L.: 1977, Progress and Its Problems, University of California Press, Berkeley.
Laudan, L.: 1987, ‘Progress or Rationality? The Prospects for Normative Naturalism’, American Philosophical Quarterly 24, 19–31.
Laudan, R. and L. Laudan: 1989, ‘Dominance and the Disunity of Method: Solving the Problems of Innovation and Consensus’, Philosophy of Science 56, 221–37.
Levi, I.: 1980, The Enterprise of Knowledge, MIT Press, Cambaridge, MA.
Oppenheimer, J. R.: 1941, ‘The Mesotron and the Quantum Theory of Fields’, in: E. Fermi et al. (eds), Nuclear Physics, American Institute of Physics, Philadelphia, pp. 39–50.
Pauli, W.: 1979, Wissenschaftlicher Briefwechsel mit Bohr, Einstein, Heisenberg u.a. Vol. 1. A. Hermann et al. (eds), Springer, Berlin.
Platt, J. R.: 1964, ‘Strong Inference’, Science 146, 347–53.
Rueger, A.: 1990, ‘Independence from Future Theories’, PSA 1990. Vol. 1. A. Fine et al. (eds), Philosopphy of Science Association, East Lansing, pp. 203–11.
Rueger, A.: 1992, ‘Attitudes Towards Infinities. Responses to Anomalies in Quantum Electrodynamics, 1927–1947’, Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences 22, 309–37.
Sarkar, H.: 1983, A Theory of Method, University of California Press, Berkeley.
Schweber, S. S.: 1994, QED and the Men Who Made It, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Solomon, M.: 1992, ‘Scientific Rationality and Human Reasoning’, Philosophy of Science 59, 439–55.
Tweney, R. D., M. E. Doherty, and C. R. Mynatt (eds.): 1981, On Scientific Thinking, Columbia University Press, New York.
Tweney, R. D.: 1989, ‘A Framework for the Cognitive Psychology of Science’, in: B. Gholson et al. (eds.), Psychology of Science, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 342–66.
Ziman, J. M.: 1987, ‘The Problem of “Problem Choice”’, Minerva 25, 92–106.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Additional information
For criticism and advice I thank Tilman Lichter, Bill Talbott, Catherine Wilson, and, in particular, an anonymous referee for Synthese.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Rueger, A. Risk and diversification in theory choice. Synthese 109, 263–280 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00413769
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00413769
Keywords
- Scientific Community
- Good Theory
- Methodological Problem
- Theory Choice
- Scientific Progress