Abstract
Since rationality is a normative ideal, it is difficult to see how a theory of rationality might be subjected to empirical evaluation. This paper explores various aspects of this problem in relation to the work of L. J. Cohen, Amos Tversky and Daviel Kahneman, Ellery Eells, Isaac Levi, and Henry Kyburg. Special consideration is given to its significance for testing systems of inductive logic.
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Smokler, H. Are theories of rationality empirically testable?. Synthese 82, 297–306 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00413666
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00413666