Summary
Inductivism is understood as the explication of the degree of confirmation as conditional logical probability. Inductivism is not recommendable in the form of Carnap's λ-system, but tenable in the form of Bayesianism. Objections directed at it are either irrelevant or can be taken account of within Bayesianism.
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Vetter, H. Inductivism and falsificationism reconcilable. Synthese 23, 226–233 (1971). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00413628
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00413628
Keywords
- Logical Probability
- Conditional Logical Probability