Abstract
In the most common approaches to belief dynamics, states of belief are represented by sets that are closed under logical consequence. In an alternative approach, they are represented by non-closed belief bases. This representation has attractive properties not shared by closed representations. Most importantly, it can account for repeated belief changes that have not yet been satisfactorily accounted for in the closed approach.
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Hansson, S.O. In defense of base contraction. Synthese 91, 239–245 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00413568
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00413568