Abstract
This paper has two aims. The first is to criticize epistemological externalism in a way different from most other criticisms. Most criticisms claim externalism fails because it does not adequately explicate ordinary notions of knowledge and justification. Such criticisms are often unhelpful to the externalist because he may not even intend his theory to be such an explication. The criticism presented here avoids this difficulty. The other aim, achieved en route to this criticism, is to explode a dogma of contemporary epistemology — that the primary end of epistemic endeavors is truth — and to bring to light the many other important goals there are for such endeavors in addition to truth. Several of these goals pertain to the power of knowledge in social contexts. The criticism ultimately made of externalism is that externalist knowledge is defective because it fails to achieve these extra-verific goals of epistemic endeavors.
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Moore, J.A. Knowledge, society, power, and the promise of epistemological externalism. Synthese 88, 379–398 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00413554
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00413554
Keywords
- Social Context
- Important Goal
- Externalist Knowledge
- Ordinary Notion
- Contemporary Epistemology