Abstract
Initial assessments of the economic deregulation of the U.S. airline industry indicated that most consumers gained from the increased competition in the airline market. More recent studies have reached less favorable conclusions. In this study, changes in passenger welfare are determined for 19 U.S. destination cities for the years 1979, 1983, and 1987 on the basis of Hicks' equivalent variation measure, using a counterfactual research design. Particular attention is given to variations in consumer welfare gains/losses depending on (a) the proportion of the change in air fares attributed to deregulation, and (b) the destination airport's classification. The estimates suggest that travelers to large, long-standing hub cities were generally insulated from any large post-1979 welfare changes. Travelers to new hubs experienced substantial welfare declines between 1979 and 1987 — although their post-1983 welfare changes were uniformly positive. Travel to nonhub airports showed the greatest variance, with both the relatively largest welfare gains and the relatively largest losses.
Zusammenfassung
Mitte der siebziger Jahre führten ein niedriges Wirtschaftswachstum und hohe Inflationsraten im amerikanischen Kongreß zu Bestrebungen, solche staatlichen Reglementierungen abzubauen, die das Preisniveau “unnötig” erhöhten. Das erste Ziel dieser Bestrebungen war der kommerzielle Luftverkehr. Das Argument war, daß der Abbau aller ökonomischen Reglementierungen im Interesse der Passagiere liege, da er zu größerem Wettbewerb unter den Fluggesellschaften führen werde. Mit der Verabschiedung eines entsprechenden Gesetzes im Jahre 1978 begann der allmähliche vierjährige Abbau aller Preis- und Routenreglementierungen der amerikanischen Bundesregierung. Erste Bewertungen dieser Politik kamen zu dem Ergebnis, daß die meisten Passagiere von dem gestiegenen Wettbewerb unter den Fluggesellschaften profitierten. Neuere Studien kommen zu weniger günstigen Ergebnissen und deuten auf zunehmende Marktkonzentration und auf höhere Flugpreise. Aufgrund dieser Ergebnisse fordern einige Politiker in den Vereinigten Staaten eine erhöhte Reglementierung des kommerziellen Luftverkehrs.
Die Autorinnen berichten über eine Studie zu den Veränderungen der Passagier-Wohlfahrt bei flügen in 19 Städte der USA. Die beobachteten Veränderungszeiträume waren 1979 bis 1983, 1983 bis 1987 und 1979 bis 1987. Besonders beachtet wurde, (a) wie Veränderungen der Passagierwohlfahrt davon beeinflußt werden, welcher Anteil der Preisveränderungen der Deregulierung zugeschrieben wird, und ob es sich (b) beim Zielflughafen um einen etablierten, einen neueren oder gar keinen Knotenpunkt handelt. Datengrundlage für die Schätzung der Nachfrage nach Flügen war eine Kombination von Flugverkehrsdaten und Einkommens-und Bevölkerungsdaten der amtlichen amerikanischen Statistik. Diese Daten erlauben die Berechnung von kurz- und langfristigen Veränderungen der Passagierwohlfahrt mit Hilfe eines ursprünglich von Hicks vorgeschlagenen Äquivalenzmaßes.
Die Ergebnisse der Studie zeigen, daß Flugreisende zu großen etablierten Knotenpunkt-Flughäfen kaum Veränderungen in ihrer Wohlfahrt erlitten. Reisende zu Flughäfen, die nach 1979 zu Knotenpunkten wurden, erlitten in der Zeit zwischen 1979 und 1987 insgesamt deutliche Wohlfahrtsverluste, wenn auch die Veränderungen ab 1983 durchweg positiv waren. Die größten positiven und negativen Veränderungen wurden für Reisende zu Flughäfen beobachtet, die keine Knotenpunkte sind.
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Additional information
Jutta M. Joesch is an Assistant Professor and Cathleen D. Zick an Associate Professor in the Department of Family and Consumer Studies at the University of Utah, 228 Alfred C. Emery Building, Salt Lake City, UT 84112, USA.
The research reported in this article was supported in part by a grant from the University of Utah Research Committee. The project could not have been completed without the valuable computer programming assistance of David Huth and the excellent research assistance of Paul Childs. W. Keith Bryant, John R. Burton, Michael F. Cohen, Robin A. Douthitt, Robert N. Mayer, Ken R. Smith, and Daigh Tufts provided helpful comments on an earlier draft of this manuscript.
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Second International Conference on Research in the Consumer Interest, sponsored by the American Council on Consumer Interests, Snowbird, Utah, August 1990.
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Joesch, J.M., Zick, C.D. Growing market concentration and changes in consumer welfare: The case of the U.S. commercial airline market. J Consum Policy 13, 321–353 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00412335
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00412335