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Erkenntnis

, Volume 36, Issue 1, pp 103–112 | Cite as

Moral realism and moral judgments

  • Frederik Kaufman
Article
  • 35 Downloads

Abstract

For moral realists moral judgments will be a kind of factual judgment that involves the basically reliable apprehension of an objective moral reality. I argue that factual judgments display at least some degree of conceptual sensitivity to error, while moral judgments do not. Therefore moral judgments are not a kind of factual judgment.

Keywords

Moral Judgment Moral Realism Factual Judgment Conceptual Sensitivity Objective Moral Reality 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1992

Authors and Affiliations

  • Frederik Kaufman
    • 1
  1. 1.Dep. of Philosophy & ReligionIthaca CollegeIthacaUSA

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