Abstract
The author shows that, after the great evolution of U.S. product liability law in the seventies, a backlash was inevitable. These restrictions are demonstrated by reference to state statutes, court decisions, court procedures, and theories. The author argues that lobbying of powerful interest groups eventually was responsible for stopping and even reversing the expansion of products liability law.
Zusammenfassung
Der Autor weist nach, daß nach den großen Umwälzungen des Produkthaftpflichtrechts in den siebziger Jahren ein Stillstand, ja sogar ein Rückschritt eingetreten ist. Der Autor zeigt dies an vielen Bereichen auf, etwa der einzelstaatlichen Gesetzgebung, der Gerichtspraxis im materiellen und Verfahrensrecht, und der Theoriediskussion. Dies ist vor dem Hintergrund eines umfangreichen “lobying” der betroffenen Interessenverbände zu sehen.
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Additional information
Peter B. Maggs is Corman Professor of Law at the University of Illinois College of Law, 504 East Pennsylvania Avenue, Champaign, IL 61820, USA.
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Maggs, P.B. Recent developments in products liability law in the USA. J Consum Policy 14, 29–33 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00380274
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00380274