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Why actions might be willings

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Bibliography

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Puget Sound, USA

    Eugene Schlossberger

  2. Seattle University, USA

    Ron Talmage

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  1. Eugene Schlossberger
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  2. Ron Talmage
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Schlossberger, E., Talmage, R. Why actions might be willings. Philos Stud 38, 199–203 (1980). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00374337

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00374337

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