Husserl Studies

, Volume 8, Issue 3, pp 205–220

Phenomenology, possible worlds and negation

  • Wojciech Krysztofiak


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.


  1. 1.
    On this distinction, see Charles W.Harvey, “Husserl's phenomenology and possible worlds semantics: A reexamination”, Husserl Studies 3 (1987): 197–207.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    On the transcendental subjectivity and transcendental reflexion, see J.N.Mohanty, The Possibility of Transcendental Philosophy (Martinus Nijhoff: Dordrecht, 1985).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. 3.
    In Ideas I, § § 89–94, Husserl distinguishes between the complete noema and ‘a noematic Sinn’ which is an element of the neoma. The neomatic Sinn is just a meaning-entity. Husserl asserts that the neoma of judgment is the meaning of a sentence used within a given judgment.Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    See David WoodruffSmith and RonaldMcIntyre, “Husserl's Identification of Meaning and Noema”, The Monist 59 (1975): 115–132.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. 5.
    In his “The World as Noema and as Referent”, Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 3 (1972): 15–26 Guido Küng says that meanings are a special kind of noemata. Dagfinn Føllesdal asserts that noemata are a generalisation of the notion of meaning. See his “Husserl's Notion of the Noema”, The Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969): 680–687.Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    See Ideas I, § § 84–85.Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Cf. Ideas I §§ 87–90 and 128. Føllesdal accepts this thesis, too. He writes: “The noematic Sinn is that in virtue of which consciousness relates to the object.” (“Husserl's Notion of the Noema”, ibid., p. 682.)Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Cf. Ideas I, § 124.Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    On this distinction, cf. Ideas I, §§ 10, 11 and 134. Husserl says that formal apophantics investigates various ontological forms and syntactical categories, such as states of affair, relation, property, quantity, quality, etc. On the concept of formal ontology, cf. N. B.Cocchiarella, “Formal Ontology”, in HansBurkhardt and BarrySmith (eds.), Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology (Philosophia: Munich-Philadelphia-Vienna: 1991), Vol. 2: L-Z, 640–647, and Barry Smith, “An Essay in Formal Ontology”, Grazer Philosophische Studien 6 (1978): 39–62.Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    In Cartesianische Meditationen, §§ 14 and 17, Husserl distinguishes between the stratum of the ‘cogito’ and the stratum of the ‘cogitatum’. This is just another expression of the opposition between the noetic and the noematic stratum of consciousness.Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    Cf. Cartesianische Meditationen, § 14.Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    The concept of illocutionary force was introduced by JohnSearle in his book Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge University Press: London, 1977), esp. chapter 3.Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    See Ideas I, § 93.Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    The concept of foundation is not clear in Husserl's works. However, there are attempts at the formalisation of this notion. But one must notice that they are not sufficient. These formal definitions are only employable in the filed of noematic contents. See BarrySmith and D.Murray, “Logic, Form, and Matter” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume LV (1981), pp. 47–63, and Barry Smith and Kevin Mulligan, “Framework for Formal Ontology”, Topoi 2 (1983): 73–85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. 15.
    See Charles Harvey and Jaakko Hintikka, “Modalization and Modalities”, forthcoming in Phenomenology and the Formal Sciences (Kluwer: Dordrecht).Google Scholar
  16. 16.
    On the discussion of this question, see Ch. Harvey, “Husserl's phenomenology and possible worlds semantics”, ibid.Google Scholar
  17. 17.
    See Harvey and Hintikka, “Modalization and Modalities”.Google Scholar
  18. 18.
  19. 19.
    See Hua I, 52. Cf. Harvey and Hintikka, “Modalization and Modalities”.Google Scholar
  20. 20.
    This is not explicitly asserted by Husserl.Google Scholar
  21. 21.
    Cf. Experience and Judgment, trans. J. S. Churchill and K. Ameriks (Northwestern University Press: Evanston, 1973), §§ 17–21.Google Scholar
  22. 22.
    Ibid., p. 272.Google Scholar
  23. 23.
    Ideas I, esp. § 133.Google Scholar
  24. 24.
    See Harvey and Hintikka, “Modalization and Modalities”.Google Scholar
  25. 25.
    Mohanty accepts a similar conclusion. He writes: “The idea of pluralism of worlds has come to stay... The transcendental philosopher, therefore, cannot start with a preferred representation of the world.” (The Possibility of Transcendental Philosophy, p. XXIV).Google Scholar
  26. 26.
    NicolasRescher and R.Brandom introduce this concept in their book The Logic of Inconsistency: A Study in Non-Standard Possible-Worlds Semantics and Ontology (Blackwell: Oxford, 1980).Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1992

Authors and Affiliations

  • Wojciech Krysztofiak
    • 1
  1. 1.University of SzczecinGermany

Personalised recommendations