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I would like to thank Thomas Hurka, whose penetrating comments on an earlier incarnation of this paper, given at the Western Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, led to numerous revisions. Responsibility for the remaining faults is mine alone.
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Wolf, C. Social choice and normative population theory: A person affecting solution to parfit's mere addition paradox. Philos Stud 81, 263–282 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00372786
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00372786