Conclusion
The foregoing considerations have shown that on the Fregean model, no descriptive rendition of the meaning of a word, and no feature of the subject's psychological state, will be sufficient to answer the question of how reference takes place. Reference is determined by an independent semantical object, and the mind is limited by its perceptual access to this external semantical realm. The psychological and epistemic states of the language user will be causally influenced by this perceptual contact, and such causal influences will enable the subject to evince the appropriate behavioral signs of comprehension. But the internal effects produced by the perception of meaning are not in principle sufficient to individuate their semantical causes, and hence some of the prominent criticisms of the traditional theory are simply not applicable to Frege's system.
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Schweizer, P. Blind grasping and Fregean senses. Philos Stud 62, 263–287 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00372394
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00372394