Philosophical Studies

, Volume 32, Issue 4, pp 419–423 | Cite as

When do we do what we do?

  • Glenn Ross


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  1. [1]
    Davidson, Donald: ‘Agency’, in R. Binkley, R. Bronaugh, and A. Maras (eds.), Agent, Action, and Reason, University of Toronto Press, (Toronto, 1971), pp. 3–25.Google Scholar
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    Davidson, Donald: ‘The Individuation of Events’, in N. Rescher, et al. (eds.), Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel (D. Reidel Publ. Co., Dordrecht, 1969), pp. 216–234.Google Scholar
  3. [3]
    Davidson, Donald: ‘The Logical Form of Action Sentences’, in N. Rescher (ed.), The Logic of Decision and Action (University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 1967), pp. 81–95.Google Scholar
  4. [4]
    Helm, Paul: ‘Are “Cambridge” Changes Non-Events?’, Analysis 35 (1975), 140–144.Google Scholar
  5. [5]
    Lewis, David: ‘The Paradoxes of Time Travel’, American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (1976), 145–152.Google Scholar
  6. [6]
    Vollrath, John: ‘When Actions Are Causes’, Philosophical Studies 27 (1975), 329–339.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company 1977

Authors and Affiliations

  • Glenn Ross
    • 1
  1. 1.University of ArizonaUSA

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