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How to infer belief from knowledge

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Peterson, P.L. How to infer belief from knowledge. Philosophical Studies 32, 203–209 (1977). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00367730

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00367730

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