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I will not repeat here all of the acknowledgments made in Dunn (1987). I do though want to add the name of Roxana Reyes, to whom I owe the magnificent quotation from Bradley that serves as the “frontispiece” to the present paper, and the names of my research assistant Monica Holland, and one of my students, Edwin Mares, who have given me helpful comments. Also, versions of this paper have been read at Rutgers University, the University of Massachusetts, La Trobe University, the University of Adelaide, the University of Sydney, a meeting of the Society for Exact Philosophy at the University of Alberta, and at a conference on “Problems and Changes in the Concept of Predication” at the University of California Humanities Research Institute at Irvine. I have benefitted from the discussion on all of these occasions. Finally, I want to take this occasion to advertise the fact that Phillip Kremer (1990) proved the precise form of the conjecture of Dunn (1987) concerning the relation between relevant predication and Glen Hellman's syntactic characterization of strictness. In fact, Kremer found size possible conjectures in the vicinity, proving four of them true and the other two false, and so the odds were slightly on my side. Incidentally, such a syntactical characterization would seem to allow for the apparatus of relevant predication without its being defined via an underlying relevance logic. This might be useful if the (computational?) overhead of relevance logic proves too high for certain applications, e.g., as to the Frame Problem in Dunn (1989).
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Dunn, J.M. Relevant predication 2: Intrinsic properties and internal relations. Philosophical Studies 60, 177–206 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00367469
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00367469