Conclusions
Insofar as much of commonsense morality is solely rights-focused, insofar as our commonsense duties to our M-relations often involve comparative and not noncomparative goods, and insofar as commonsense morality is a morality of rule following, to those extents Parfit's claim that commonsense morality is self-defeating does not apply. Furthermore, even if Parfit's claim that morality is self-defeating does have a substantive basis and so we amend M as Parfit recommends, because Parfit's revisions of M fail to move M toward C we will be as far from a unification of M and C as we were at the beginning of the project. In short, although there may be a unity to morality, Parfit has not uncovered it.
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Gruzalski, B. Parfit's unified theory of morality. Philosophical Studies 50, 143–152 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00355166
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00355166