Abstract
It is often held that moral considerations take precedence over considerations of other kinds in determining what we ought to do. I contend that this claim is ambiguous and argue that objections to each interpretation of it can be met only by rejecting the other. One surprising consequence of my argument is that no deontic moral theory can effectively guide action unless it is conjoined with a theory of the good. Another interesting consequence is that the deontologists' favorite objection to teleological theories — the objection from injustice — does not go through.
Similar content being viewed by others
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Philips, M. Moralism and the good. Philosophical Studies 52, 131–139 (1987). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00354162
Received:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00354162