Conclusion
We may, and should, reject Davidson's (P2) — the claim that any agent who judges (unconditionally) that it is better to do x than to do y is more strongly motivated to do x than to do y — without having to abandon a causal theory of action. (P2) is false. The connection between unconditional judgments and the balance of an agent's motivation is more complex than Davidson thinks; and this holds as well for the connection between intentions and motivations. The extent to which an agent is self-controlled is also an important factor. This is not to say, however, that there is no connection, nor that to explain an intentional action by citing the reason(s) for which it was intended and performed is not to give a causal explanation of the action.
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Mele, A.R. Akrasia, reasons, and causes. Philosophical Studies 44, 345–368 (1983). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00353541
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00353541