Abstract
The use of tradable emission rights as environmental policy instruments may affect the conditions for strategic interaction between regulated firms and thus have implications for competition policy. This paper presents an analysis of how, and under what conditions, emission rights can be used strategically by oligopolistic firms for predatory and exclusionary purposes.
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Mørch von der Fehr, NH. Tradable emission rights and strategic interaction. Environmental and Resource Economics 3, 129–151 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00338781
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00338781