Abstract
A mathematical model of replicator evolution is considered. Replicators are words of a formal language specifying a strategy for a parlour game. They replicate with mutations and are selected according to their pay-off against other replicators.
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Kůrka, P. Evolution of replicators playing a strategic game. Biol. Cybern. 52, 211–217 (1985). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00336977
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00336977