Abstract
Several game forms are given for Nash implementing general social choice correspondences (SCC's) which satisfy Maskin's conditions of monotonicity and No Veto Power. The game forms have smaller strategy spaces than those used in previously studied mechanisms: the strategy for an individual consists of an alternative, two subsets (of alternatives), and a player number. For certain types of economic and political SCC's, including α-majority rule, the Walrasian, and Lindahl correspondence, the strategy space reduces to an alternative and a vector, where the number of components of the vector is at most twice the dimension of the alternative space.
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This paper was inspired by Tatsuyoshi Saijo's dissertation. I am greatly indebted to Kim Border, Leo Hurwicz, and Tatsuyoshi Saijo for some very helpful discussions. I acknowledge support of NSF grant No. SES 8208184.
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McKelvey, R.D. Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences. Soc Choice Welfare 6, 139–156 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00303168
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00303168