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On the generic emptiness of the local core of voting games

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Abstract

The local core of voting games is investigated from a genericity point of view. There exist preference profiles for which it is empty and there exist preference profiles for which the local core and its complement are both dense in the set of alternatives. Furthermore the subset of profiles having an empty local core is dense in the whole set of profiles. Some remarks on the choice of the topology are provided.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. C.R.E.M.E.R.C., Faculté des Sciences Economiques, 7, place Hoche, F-35000, Rennes, France

    M. Le Breton

  2. L.E.M.E., Faculté des Sciences Economiques, 7, place Hoche, F-35000, Rennes, France

    M. Le Breton

  3. C.R.E.M.E.R.C., Université de Caen, F-14032, Caen Cédex, France

    M. Salles

Authors
  1. M. Le Breton
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  2. M. Salles
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Additional information

We are grateful to the French Commissariat Général du Plan for financial support and to Norman Schofield for having the opportunity to read McKelvey and Schofield (1986) before the publication. We are indebted to two anonymous referees for helpful suggestions and to Jerry Kelly for important comments and for correcting our English.

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Le Breton, M., Salles, M. On the generic emptiness of the local core of voting games. Soc Choice Welfare 4, 287–294 (1987). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00286869

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00286869

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