Equilibrium and efficiency under pure entitlement systems

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This paper was prompted by discussion with Milton Wachsberg and Calvin Normore, and has been greatly influenced by further discussions with Joseph Greenberg and with Hugo Sonnenschein. I would also like to thank Kim Border, Lewis Kornhauser, Charles Plott, and Marc Vellrath for their comments on earlier drafts.

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Green, E.J. Equilibrium and efficiency under pure entitlement systems. Public Choice 39, 185–212 (1982). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00242156

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Keywords

  • Public Finance
  • Entitlement System